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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3211 
___________ 
 
ROOSEVELT CARABALI RUIZ,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;  
MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL CENTER;  
CAMERON LINDSAY, MVCC Warden;  
CORNELL COMPANIES, INC.; 
MS. M DAWSON, Adm. Director; 
DR. SONTHEITER;  
MR. BUCKLES, Associate Warden; 
HARLEY G. LAPPIN, Director 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00068) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: May 2, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM. 
 Roosevelt Carabali Ruiz, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 
order dismissing his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
Ruiz is a federal prisoner who was formerly incarcerated at the Moshannon Valley 
Correctional Center (“Moshannon Valley”), a private correctional facility in Philipsburg, 
Pennsylvania.  In March 2010, he filed a complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that he 
had been denied adequate medical care at Moshannon Valley in violation of his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.
1
  In the complaint, Ruiz named as defendants: the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and BOP Director Harley G. Lappin; Cornell Companies, Inc. 
(“Cornell”), the private company that owns and operates Moshannon Valley; Moshannon 
Valley; Warden Cameron Lindsay; Associate Warden Buckles; Administrative Director 
M. Dawson; and Dr. Sontheiter.   
The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who found that the complaint failed 
to allege sufficient facts to state an Eighth Amendment claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 
                                            
1
  Although Ruiz sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Bivens, his suit is 
properly construed as an action under Bivens, not § 1983, because it is against federal 
(and alleged federal) actors, not state actors.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (recognizing a 
private cause of action to recover damages against federal actors for constitutional 
violations).        
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1915(e)(2)(B), but advised Ruiz that he was permitted to amend his complaint to correct 
the defects.  Ruiz then filed an amended complaint in which he explained that he was 
suffering from a boil in his anus, hemorrhoids, pain in his legs, a stomach ache, and an 
“extra collar bone towards the neck.”  (Am. Compl., Dist. Ct. Dkt # 8, ¶ 35.)  He also 
stated that he excreted blood during bowel movements.  According to Ruiz, he was seen 
by a doctor at some point, but his complaints were ignored, his treatment delayed, and his 
care inadequate.   
After reviewing the amended complaint, the Magistrate Judge determined that 
Ruiz had succeeded in stating an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Sontheiter insofar 
as he alleged that the doctor refused to take any action to treat Ruiz’s passing of blood 
during bowel movements, but had not stated any other claims against any other 
defendants.  The Magistrate Judge directed Ruiz to provide copies of his amended 
complaint and instructions for service upon Dr. Sontheiter. 
 Instead of complying with the Magistrate Judge’s instructions to serve the 
amended complaint, Ruiz filed a number of evidentiary documents concerning his Eighth 
Amendment claims—primarily medical records and grievance reports.
2
  The Magistrate 
Judge reviewed the documents and determined that they “dispel[led] any claim that Dr. 
Sontheiter or anyone else was deliberately indifferent to Ruiz’[s] medical needs.”  (R & 
                                            
2
  The proceedings were stayed for several months while Ruiz was housed in 
Moshannon Valley’s special housing unit where he was precluded from using the law 
library.  Ruiz was eventually transferred to a facility in Georgia and regained access to 
his legal materials.  
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R, Dist. Ct. Dkt. #25, at p. 1.)  Accordingly, he recommended that Ruiz’s Eighth 
Amendment claim be dismissed.  He noted, however, that Ruiz might be able to state a 
negligence claim pursuant to the District Court’s diversity jurisdiction “[b]ecause [he] is 
now in another state,” and allowed him another opportunity to amend.  (Id. at p. 3.) 
 Ruiz filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation as 
well as a second amended complaint.  Although his first amended complaint focused on 
the inadequate treatment he received for problems with his anus and bowel movements, 
his second amended complaint alleged that Dr. Sontheiter failed to adequately treat the 
back pain he suffers as a result of “congenital degeneration due to his poliomyelitis.”  (2d 
Am. Compl., Dist. Ct. Dkt. # 26, at ¶ 11.)  He also added a claim that he was transferred 
to the facility in Georgia in retaliation for filing grievances concerning his medical 
treatment and for filing the complaint in this case. 
 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
and dismissed the complaints in their entirety, apparently pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B), on the ground that “[t]he complaint, as repeatedly amended, fails to allege 
either negligence or deliberate indifference on the part of any defendant.”  (Mem. Order, 
Dist. Ct. Dkt # 28, at p. 1.)  Ruiz timely appealed from the District Court’s order. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary, requiring 
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us to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
  Ruiz’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in dismissing his 
Eighth Amendment claim.
3
  We have reviewed the record and conclude that dismissal 
was proper, although for different reasons than those stated by the District Court.  See 
United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2009) (“An appellate court may 
affirm a result reached by the District Court on different reasons, as long as the record 
supports the judgment.”)  First, Ruiz may not bring a Bivens claim against the BOP.  See 
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001) (explaining that Bivens claims 
may be brought only against individual federal officers, not the United States or the 
BOP).  Moreover, no action lies under Bivens against Moshannon Valley or Cornell, the 
private corporation that owns and operates it.  See id. at 63.  Ruiz also failed to state a 
claim against the individual defendants who were employed by Cornell, as the Supreme 
Court recently held that a Bivens claim is not cognizable against employees of a private 
prison under these circumstances.  See Minneci v. Pollard, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 617, 
                                            
3
 As noted above, Ruiz attempted to raise a retaliation claim in his second 
amended complaint.  It appears, however, that the Magistrate Judge and District Court 
overlooked this claim when they dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints 
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.  That said, Ruiz does not challenge the 
District Court’s error on appeal—in fact, he does not mention the retaliation claim at all.  
While we construe the submissions of a pro se appellant liberally, we must conclude that 
Ruiz intended to abandon this claim.  See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 
Cir. 2008).  Similarly, we note that, to the extent that Ruiz was given an opportunity to 
state a negligence claim against Dr. Sontheiter, he never did so and does not argue 
otherwise now.        
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626 (2012) (refusing to imply the existence of a Bivens action where “a federal prisoner 
seeks damages from privately employed personnel working at a privately operated 
federal prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of 
traditional state tort law (such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue 
here)”).  Finally, while Ruiz’s claim against BOP Director Lappin could have proceeded 
if properly pled, he did not allege in any of his complaints that Director Lappin had any 
personal involvement in the denial of his medical care, and a Bivens claim cannot be 
premised upon a theory of respondeat superior.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. ---, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009); Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 
F.3d 60, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2011).   
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm. 
 
